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Christian Philosophical Theology, by Stephen T. Davis. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2006. Pp. 312. $95 (Cloth).
JOSHUA C. THUROW, University of Wisconsin-Madison
In this stimulating and wide-ranging new book, Stephen Davis presents 
16 essays on a variety of issues in Christian philosophical theology: four 
on God and belief in God, six on the resurrection and the incarnation, four 
on redemption, and two on theological method. With a mixture of new 
and previously published essays, this book is best regarded as a summary 
and development of Davis’s views on philosophical theology.
Overall, Davis is concerned to demonstrate the rationality of core Chris-
tian doctrines, which includes elucidating and defending what he takes to 
be the best accounts of these core doctrines. In the fi rst section, “Why Be-
lieve? God and Belief in God,” Davis argues (1) that the internal testimony 
of the Holy Spirit helps believers to properly weigh the force of the evi-
dence for theism and various Christian doctrines, (2) that the cosmological 
argument can be used to demonstrate the rationality of Christian belief, 
(3) that God is a sovereign creator and revealer, and (4) that a version of 
the social theory of the Trinity called “Perichoretic monotheism” is true. 
What is distinct about Perichoretic monotheism is that, according to the 
theory, “the Persons [of the Trinity] are fully open to each other, . . . they 
‘see with each others eyes,’ the boundaries between them are transparent 
to each other, and each ontologically embraces the others” (p. 72).
In the second section, “Why Believe in Jesus? Resurrection and Incarna-
tion,” Davis begins by arguing that the scriptures give us a reliable por-
trait of Jesus and goes on to argue on a priori grounds, scriptural grounds, 
and on the basis of the Jesus: Mad, Bad or God argument that God became 
incarnate in Jesus. He then argues that the New Testament presents Jesus 
as having been resurrected bodily from the dead and the disciples and 
others as having literally seen (as opposed to visualizing Jesus by the aid 
of God) Jesus aft er he died. Finally, he presents a kenotic theory of the 
incarnation and argues that his theory is orthodox.
In the third section, “How are we Saved? Redemption,” Davis fi rst ar-
gues on philosophical grounds alone that grace-oriented systems of salva-
tion are superior to karma-oriented systems. He then argues that God is 
wrathful towards sin and sinners and that the blood of Christ needed to be 
shed in order for humans to be redeemed. Finally, he describes the Chris-
tian view of salvation by faith in Jesus, arguing along the way (in chapter 
13) that the Protestant and Catholic views of salvation and justifi cation do 
not diﬀ er substantially, and defends a ‘temporary disembodiment’ theory 
of the general resurrection according to which people exist disembodied 
between their death and the parousia.
In the fourth and fi nal section, “How to do Theology? Theological 
Method,” Davis defends a kind of mediating view between Catholic and 
Protestant views on the relation between scripture and tradition. He ar-
gues in chapter 15 that, “Tradition is necessary for interpreting Scripture 
and that Scripture takes priority over Tradition, because it is our highest 
source and norm of religious truth” (p. 279). Finally, he argues that the 
best way to understand how the Church uses the Bible is to understand 
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the Church to believe that God speaks through Bible; so, according to the 
Church, the Bible is true in two senses: it says true things and it is some-
thing we can submit to and trust as a guide for our lives.
Throughout the book Davis is quite ecumenical, most oft en defending 
a position that he thinks most Christians could agree on. Indeed, the most 
interesting and powerful chapters in the book are chapters wherein he dis-
cusses the doctrinal diﬀ erences and commonalities between Catholicism 
and Protestantism. Chapters 13, “Bodily Redemption,” and 15, “Scripture, 
Tradition, and Theological Authority,” stand out in this regard as especially 
well-argued and persuasive. Davis’s work in these chapters demonstrates 
how good analytic philosophy can usefully contribute to theology.
Although there is much to admire in this book, particularly the two 
chapters just mentioned, I do have a few questions and criticisms about 
various arguments in the book.
As I mentioned earlier, Davis’s main goal is to demonstrate that belief 
in some core Christian doctrines is rational. Davis does not intend to ar-
gue that these Christian doctrines are rational in the sense that all rational 
people who carefully consider the evidence ought to embrace them. As 
he writes, “rationality is in part person-relative. That is, belief in a certain 
proposition might be rational for one person and irrational for another. Ac-
cordingly, . . . no matt er how logically impeccable a given piece of natural 
theology may be, a religious skeptic who wants to resist its conclusions can 
always fi nd reason to do so” (p. 21). Davis’s view here could be interpreted 
in two diﬀ erent ways; one interpretation is trivially true, the other is dubi-
ous and in need of further defense. The fi rst interpretation takes Davis’s 
claim, “belief in a certain proposition may be rational for one person and 
irrational for another,” at face value. This claim is trivially true for it is 
trivial that two people can have diﬀ erent sets of evidence, and one person’s 
set may justify p while the other’s set justifi es not-p. The religious skeptic 
could (and should) grant that some Christian believers may be rational be-
cause the evidence they have supports Christian beliefs and they lack the 
evidence that the skeptic thinks undermines Christian belief. Even so, the 
skeptic could say that there is a sense in which Christian belief is irrational: 
it is irrational considering all the evidence we have (where ‘we’ includes 
at least all informed people). This leads to the second interpretation of 
Davis’s claim. Perhaps he means to say that even if two people had all the 
available evidence, it could be that one was rational in believing in Chris-
tianity while the other wasn’t. But, this claim is dubious. It is the evidence 
that justifi es one’s belief (and we should understand ‘evidence’ in a broad 
way so that it includes testimony and religious experiences as evidence) 
and, in the case imagined, both people have the same evidence. So, what-
ever proposition the evidence supports is what both people are justifi ed 
in believing. Furthermore, it seems clear that a given set of evidence can’t 
support both a proposition and its negation; a set of evidence, considered 
as a whole, either supports p, not-p, or neither. Consequently, whichever 
proposition the evidence does support, if any, is what both agents are justi-
fi ed in believing. The two agents cannot rationally have diﬀ erent doxastic 
att itudes towards Christianity. So, if Davis means to say that two people in 
this situation could rationally have diﬀ erent doxastic att itudes towards the 
truth of Christianity, he needs to say more in defense of his claim.
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Whatever he says about this matt er, Davis would probably insist that, 
if we considered all the available evidence, that evidence would support 
Christianity. The problem with non-believers is that they are blinded to 
the evidence that is there by pride (p. 12). The Holy Spirit, according to 
Davis, helps believers to assess the evidence properly. Davis writes, “the 
Spirit’s testimony . . . illuminates or renders convincing evidence that is 
already there. It is not a question of propaganda or brainwashing or of 
making feeble evidence appear powerful. It is a question of removing 
blinkers and helping us to grasp the epistemic situation correctly” (p. 17). 
If the evidence really does support Christianity, and because of sin non-
believers simply don’t assess the evidence correctly, I would say, in line 
with my argument in the previous paragraph, that non-believers are ir-
rational and their belief that Christianity is false is unjustifi ed. It may 
be quite hard for them to fi nd out that their belief is unjustifi ed, but it 
nonetheless is. Aft er all, we certainly aren’t anywhere near close to infal-
lible about fi guring our which of our beliefs are justifi ed and which aren’t. 
Davis thinks that non-believers ought to know that God exists and that 
they are culpable for their non-belief. If we assume the evidence supports 
Christianity, I would agree, but I would add that part of the reason why 
non-believers are culpable for their non-belief is that their beliefs are ir-
rational. It would be interesting to know whether Davis would agree with 
my explanation.
Although many of Davis’s other arguments merit close critical att en-
tion, I only have space to examine a couple of them. First, in chapter two 
Davis utilizes the cosmological argument to argue that theism is rational. 
He asks whether his version of the principle of suﬃ  cient reason—(2) ev-
erything can be explained—is more plausible than its negation, (2') (the 
numbering is Davis’s). He says, “it does not seem possible to show which 
is more plausible. We appear to be left  with the possibility that the theist’s 
belief in the existence of God might well be rational (given the atheist’s 
rational acceptance of (2)) and that the atheist’s disbelief in the existence 
of God might well also be rational (given the theist’s rational acceptance 
of (2')).” It follows that, “belief in God is rational” (p. 35). This looks like 
a circular argument. Davis seems to grant that there are no good inde-
pendent reasons to believe either (2) or (2'), but argues that theism and 
atheism are rational because theists can rationally accept (2) and atheists 
can rationally accept (2'). But, if there are no good independent reasons to 
believe either of these claims, then the only thing that could make belief 
in them rational is rational belief in either theism or atheism, respectively. 
But, then the cosmological argument can’t be used to show that belief in 
God is rational, since we must assume that it is rational in order to show 
that belief in (2) is rational.
Second, in chapter 11 Davis argues that Karma theories of salvation are 
wrong because they can’t explain how suﬀ ering begins and because one’s 
merely having a soul in common with a later reincarnated person is insuf-
fi cient for personal identity. Both of these objections can be met. Regard-
ing the fi rst, one could take a page from the theist and suggest that free 
will is the source of suﬀ ering and that karma begins to take eﬀ ect once 
some people freely cause suﬀ ering. Furthermore, this could be the expla-
nation for the existence of suﬀ ering even if persons have always existed. 
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Regarding the second, surely we regard people who have severe memory 
loss as identical to their previous selves, so why not regard reincarnation 
as analogous to severe memory loss? Alternatively, one could say that 
what happens in reincarnation is just like what happens in Reid’s example 
of the old general, except the whole process happens much quicker, so 
there is memory continuity even though the newly reincarnated person 
does not remember anything about his earlier self (just as the old general 
does not remember anything about what his boyhood self did).
Overall, Christian Philosophical Theology is a solid work. Researchers in 
the fi eld will certainly want to be familiar with its arguments, especially 
those in chapters 13 and 15.
Crucible of Reason: Intentional Action, Practical Rationality, and Weakness of 
Will, by Keith D. Wyma. Rowman & Litt lefi eld, 2004. 307 pp. $85 (cloth), 
$29.95 (paper).
NOEL HENDRICKSON, James Madison University
One of the most puzzling aspects of human agency is how we are capable 
of performing actions that are both intentional and against deeply-held 
judgments about what should be done (i.e., “akratic” or “weak-willed” 
actions). This is particularly diﬃ  cult to understand in light of a central 
feature of some theories of intentional action, which holds that an action 
qualifi es as intentional only if it is done because of, and according to, a 
judgment that the action should be done (i.e., “rational-action” theories). 
While such theories are widely held, they have a notoriously diﬃ  cult time 
accounting for weak-willed actions. For, they require of intentional ac-
tion the very thing that is absent in cases of weakness of the will (namely, 
conforming to the agent’s judgments about what should be done). In the 
Crucible of Reason, Keith D. Wyma thoughtfully tackles this diﬃ  cult chal-
lenge with an extremely intricate examination of att empts by rational-ac-
tion theorists to account for weak-willed actions. He provides a detailed 
discussion of the work of R. M. Hare, Donald Davidson, and (especially) 
Thomas Aquinas. Ultimately, he contends that each theorist is unable to 
account for the phenomenon of weak-willed actions, especially in its more 
robust varieties. In response, he develops a new (modifi ed) Thomistic ap-
proach to accommodate more fully the real-life experience of weakness 
of the will. In addition, because this new approach works best in a full-
fl edged Thomistic and Christian framework, he provocatively suggests 
that the ability to account for weak-willed actions may serve as a part of 
the overall inductive case for Christian theism.
Wyma provides a careful, thorough, and charitable examination of 
each of the three thinkers. Among a variety of criticisms, he insightfully 
argues that each of them ultimately has to deny the reality of weakness of 
the will (at least in its most robust forms). Wyma contends that our real-
life experience of weak-willed actions includes extremely robust instances 
such as acting against fully rational judgments, against knowledge that 
what we are doing is wrong, and even against fully-formed intentions 
